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ABSTRACT 
Nora Jean Weber: Varieties of Capitalism, Welfare Typologies, and Educational Differentiation:  
A Cross-National Analysis 
(Under the direction of Donald Searing) 
 
This analysis explores the relationship between a state’s macroeconomic structure and 
welfare state typology, and its approach to educational differentiation. Educational 
differentiation describes the separation of students into unique curricular tracks, and has been 
widely discussed in studies of education and stratification. In this analysis, I explore whether 
patterns in national educational differentiation occur, based on states’ classification across two 
dimensions: variety of capitalism (based on Hall and Soskice’s “Varieties of Capitalism” theory), 
and welfare state regime (based on Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typologies). After 
operationalizing educational differentiation and taking measurements across a sample of nine 
European states, I conclude that, while some overarching trends exists, there is also significant 
within-classification variation in educational differentiation. I additionally examine primary 
government documents to identify patterns in states’ framing of education in relation to 
stratification and inequality based on the aforementioned classifications, and find no clear 
alignment with respective macroeconomic and welfare state characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION, THE 
RESEARCH QUESTION, HYPOTHESES, & METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter defines the purpose and context of this analysis. It provides a concise 
definition of educational differentiation and summarizes background information and literature 
essential to understanding the research question, methodology, and findings. 
 
1.1: Education & Cross-National Comparison 
Although a fundamental institution of every modern democratic nation, education has, 
until recently, been overlooked in comparative welfare regime and political economy research 
(Busemeyer 2015; Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011; Iversen & Stephens 2008). As studies have 
begun delving into education’s relationship to these fields, scholars have focused on the 
interplay between education and factors such as inequality and social stratification, labor 
market development, and innovation, among others. Overwhelmingly, research has suggested 
that significant links exist between a state’s organization and delivery of education, and its 
respective social and economic circumstances (Marks 2005; Hanushek and Wößman 2006; 
Pfeffer 2008, 2014; Busemeyer 2015). This consensus – that education and national socio-
economic institutions and outcomes are inextricably linked – underlines the relevance and value 
of understanding these relationships with greater nuance.  
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The purpose of this analysis is to contribute to the growing body of research into the 
relationship between national economic structure, welfare state typology, and institutionalized 
education. This analysis focuses on educational differentiation, a key distinguishing feature of 
national education systems. Educational differentiation refers to the institutionalized ways in 
which students are separated into unique curricular pathways, and is often referred to as 
“tracking” or “streaming”. Educational tracks may be distinguished by subject matter, or by the 
speed or level of complexity at which students are taught (Brunello et al 2004; Hanushek and 
Wößmann 2006; Pfeffer 2008). Traditionally, studies have defined national education systems 
broadly as exhibiting either “strict” or “weak” levels of differentiation (Pfeffer 2008, 2014). An 
education system’s degree of differentiation is typically determined by several factors, including: 
The age at which students are separated into distinct tracks; the proportion of tracks dedicated 
to general, academic, or vocational curricular trajectories; and how much autonomy students 
have to select and transfer between curricular tracks (Sorensen 1970, Page 1991, Marks 2005, 
Pfeffer 2008 and 2016). 
Prior research has examined how certain aspects of educational differentiation – 
particularly the prominence vocational training – differ across welfare regimes and varieties of 
capitalism (Wilensky 1975; Hanushek and Wößmann 2006; Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011; 
Holm et al 2013). Similarly, research has used the broad categorizations of educational 
differentiation (strict/weak) to examine trends in quality and equality of education between 
nations and welfare state typologies (Marks et al 2007; Willemse and de Beer 2012; Veloso and 
Estevinha 2013; Pfeffer 2008, 2014). However, many questions remain unanswered about how 
educational differentiation compares across nations, and what specific aspects of differentiation 
are most closely related to socio-economic equity or stratification. In this paper, I hope to 
contribute to this body of research by addressing two questions. First, I ask whether the 
structure of educational differentiation (beyond vocational training) varies significantly based 
on a nation’s overarching economic structure and welfare state typology. Second, I ask 
3 
 
whether these same variables (macroeconomic structure and welfare typology) are related to 
governmental attitudes toward education and inequality. I conclude that patterns of 
educational differentiation are most cohesive among LME-Liberal states, moderately cohesive 
among CME-Social Democratic states, and have the greatest variation among CME-
Conservative states. Intentions or attitudes of education in relation to inequality and 
stratification are largely homogenous across the sample, with no clear association to variety of 
capitalism or welfare state typology. 
This analysis begins with an overview of the literature linking varieties of capitalism 
(VoC) theory and welfare state typologies with educational structure. This is followed by a 
description of my hypotheses, methods, and sources. I then provide an overview of findings by 
variable, followed by an overarching discussion and additional considerations. To conclude, I 
suggest future pathways for exploration. 
 
1.2: Shaping Expectations - Varieties of Capitalism & Welfare State Regimes 
The basic assertion of this analysis – that educational differentiation is related to a 
nation’s economic structure and welfare state typology – is based on two bodies of theory. The 
first is Hall and Soskice’s landmark “varieties of capitalism” theory, which established a 
“framework for understanding the institutional similarities and differences among developed 
economies” and was intended to overcome shortcoming of prior models (Hall & Soskice 2001). 
The major premise of Hall and Soskice’s theory is that national trends in political economy 
result from the strategic interactions of rational actors, each attempting to promote their own 
interests. 
Hall and Soskice developed their seminal theory in response to the limitations they 
perceived in earlier approaches of explaining institutional variation between countries, which 
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had characterized nations based on factors such as the strength of the public sector, the state’s 
effectiveness in bargaining with employers and organized labor, or the ways in which firms and 
institutions responded to technological advances (ibid.).1 In their “varieties of capitalism” 
theory, Hall and Soskice pose businesses and corporate interests as the central factors shaping 
national political economy, and suggest that variations in political economy are dependent on 
the capacity of firms to coordinate their interests with other economic actors (Williams 2011; 
Busemeyer 2015). Hall and Soskice point to five core areas in which coordination occurs, 
including: organized labor, investors, suppliers and clients, employees, and vocational and 
educational training. This final sphere is particularly relevant to this analysis, as it emphasizes 
the coordination challenge that both firms and individuals (as workers) face in aligning skills 
development with labor market demands.  
From these foundations, Hall and Soskice assert that a nation’s model of capitalism may 
be categorized as either a Liberal market economy (LME) or coordinated market economy 
(CME) (Hall and Soskice 2001). Liberal markets economies exist where competition and 
hierarchy are the predominant mechanisms driving coordination between firms and the other 
actors (spheres), and equilibrium is determined by supply and demand. Conversely, coordinated 
markets occur where equilibrium is determined by strategic interaction or intervention from 
non-market actors or relationships. Among the countries highlighted in this analysis, three are 
widely considered to be Liberal market economies: the U.S., UK, and Canada. The other six are 
considered to be coordinated market economies: Germany, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, 
Finland, and Norway (ibid). 
The anticipated relationship between a nation’s categorization as an LME or CME and 
their national education system is as follows. In Liberal market economies, an emphasis on 
competition reduces both firms’ incentives to invest in institutionalized skills and vocational 
                                                          
1 Specifically, the modernization approach, neo-corporatist approach, social systems of production approach 
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education, and workers’ demand for such specialized programs (Hall & Soskice 2001; Edwards 
& Rees 2016). Firms are more likely to establish their own training systems rather than 
contributing to the development of sectoral or occupational systems, and lower job security 
among employees can create less rationale for workers to invest in industry-specific skills (ibid.). 
Scholars have also suggested ways in which national politics shape the presence and definition 
of vocational training in LMEs. Specifically, LME governments tend to favor deregulation, 
oftening makes them hostile toward labor unions, which have historically been fundamental in 
promoting apprenticeship systems (Bosch & Charest 2008). Combined, these factors result in 
national education systems in LMEs that place more emphasis on generalized skills 
development, and firms that use employees’ general academic achievement and job performance 
to determine hiring and investment in further sector-specific training.  
Contrastingly, in Coordinated Market Economies, stability, rather than competition, is 
the underlying principle. The public sector and employer associations serve as the 
“coordinating” actors between firms, and institutionalized education as a sphere in which 
coordination occurs (Hall and Soskice 2001; Sidorkin 2009; Busemeyer 2015). By incorporating 
vocational training directly into the education system, non-firm actors enable the development 
of skills among individuals respond to the corporate sector’s skills demands, without inciting 
competition that may prevent firms’ investment in training. Because of this, education systems 
in CMEs can be more diverse in their curriculums, focusing not only on general skills 
development as in LMEs, but also on training for specific industries or roles (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Williams 2011). Firms are motivated to support this training by participating more 
directly in the development of curriculum and certification systems, to ensure qualification of 
incoming workers. Similarly, hiring practices behind these vocational programs make pursuit of 
vocational or sector-specific education more attractive to students. The result is an increase in 
the institutionalization of vocational programs, and in the overall transition from education to 
work (Hall & Soskice 2001).  
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Prior research – and a simple analysis – supports Hall and Soskice’s claims about 
differing degrees of institutionalized vocational training between LMEs and CMEs. Education 
systems in LMEs typically provide what is called comprehensive primary and secondary 
education, in which all students participate in a single “stream” of general mandatory education, 
preparing students for a variety of post-secondary pathways (Verdugo 2014; Brunello et al 
2004). In CMEs, students more commonly participate in selective primary and secondary 
education, in which students are separated into differentiated curricular streams that prepare 
them more or less explicitly for future pathways, such as further studies, or specific vocational 
education and training (VET). This categorization of states as LMEs or CMEs, and the 
corresponding understanding of how each variety of capitalization institutionalizes VET, have 
been leveraged across a range of academic studies. Scholars like Marius Busemeyer, Richard 
Verdugo, and Jan Terwel have traced the historical developments of capitalist markets in the 
post-war period, focusing on interactions between business and other organized interests 
(political parties and labor unions, among others), and trends in simultaneous re-organization 
of national education systems.  
While macroeconomic factors are fundamental to understanding disparate national 
approaches to organizing and delivering education, these aspects are primarily useful for 
predicting the presence and strength of vocational tracks. Macroeconomic elements may be less 
valuable in explaining other features of educational differentiation, such as the age at which 
tracking occurs, the length of comprehensive education, or the flexibility of secondary degrees. 
Exploration of these factors may be better served by examining a second area of research: 
welfare state typologies. The foundations of most modern comparative welfare state analyses 
were established by Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s landmark text, The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism. Much like Hall and Soskice, who created new categorizations for varieties of 
capitalism based on the role of business, Esping-Andersen responded to what he perceived as 
shortcomings in prior welfare literature to establish new welfare state typologies, based on a 
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state’s emphasis and organization of public benefits (Esping-Andersen 1990). Varieties of 
welfare capitalism or welfare state regimes by Esping-Andersen’s definition, encompass 
redistributive measures and social services, as well matters such as employment and wages, and 
acknowledges other macroeconomic concerns.  
The major premise of Esping-Andersen’s analysis, based on extensive quantitative data, 
is that three welfare state typologies exist: the Liberal regime, the Conservative (or Corporatist) 
regime, and the Social Democratic regime (Esping-Andersen 1990; Stephens and Torben 
2008).2 By Esping-Andersen’s definition, Liberal regimes can be identified as systems that 
prioritize efficiency and competition, in which individuals receive public benefits primarily via 
participation in the traditional workforce. These public benefits are typically means-tested, 
extremely modest, and “often associated with stigma” (Esping-Andersen 1990). In Conservative 
welfare states, the Liberal emphasis on efficiency is replaced by a focus on subsidiarity, and 
maintaining social status and traditional family roles. Benefits cover a much broader range of 
individuals, but do little to redistribute wealth. In the third typology, Social Democratic, 
redistribution and de-commodification of labor are key characteristics, with an emphasis on 
equality of access to a much broader range of benefits than guaranteed in either Liberal or 
Conservative-corporatist regimes.  
Unlike Hall and Soskice, Esping-Andersen gives considerably less emphasis to any 
individual actor. Rather, he states that the “hope of finding one single powerful causal force 
must be abandoned; the task is to identify salient interaction-effects” (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
In this way, welfare state theory pays more balanced attention to actors at various levels, 
including citizens/workers, labor unions, and political parties, among others. Esping-Andersen 
also acknowledges that welfare state typologies are not unchanging. He points to noted shifts, 
                                                          
2 More recently, scholars have suggested a fourth cluster that encompasses southern European states, but this analysis 
focuses entirely on nations within the three original regime typologies. 
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for example, in Conservative states, and suggests that no regime type is immune to evolution 
due to macroeconomic or other forces (ibid.; Willemse and de Beer 2012; Hurrelmann 2014). 
However, the fundamental characteristics of and variation between typologies still exist, making 
these categorizations useful for cross-national comparison. 
In establishing his model, Esping-Andersen emphasized that each regime is “organized 
around its own discrete logic of organization, stratification, and societal integration” (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Stephens and Iversen 2008; Busemeyer 2015). Although education has 
traditionally been underrepresented in comparative welfare state studies, the three traditional 
typologies provide a useful basis for comparison in this analysis for two reasons. First, there is 
an objective difference in the amount and organization of public social benefits in regime type. 
In Liberal regimes, public benefits are meager and typically needs-based, and the typical path 
for securing benefits is through employment. Because of this, inequality tends to be highest in 
Liberal states. Conservative regimes, by comparison, offer a higher baseline of public benefits, 
but as certain benefits are typically tied to former employment, public welfare may do little to 
ameliorate existing social inequalities. In Social Democratic nations, public benefits are the 
most generous and least employment-dependent, and inequality is significantly lower than in 
either Liberal or Conservative regimes. Scholars have suggested a potential relationship between 
the generosity of public benefits, particularly unemployment benefits, and workers’ willingness 
to pursue sector-specific training (Edwards & Rees 2016). Before investing in less generally-
applicable skills, workers must consider the potential risk of losing their employment, and what 
public benefits they would receive if that were to occur. For this reason, one may expect to find 
more institutionalized vocational training or educational tracks with more constrained 
outcomes in nations where public benefits are more generous, and more generalized education 
in nations where benefits are meager.         
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The second way in which Esping-Andersen’s classification serves this analysis, is his 
identification, not only of trends in the organization and delivery of benefits, but also of the 
underlying patterns among each welfare state typology regarding social stratification and 
inequality. In Liberal regimes, the strong emphasis on competition and efficiency comes at the 
cost of high levels of inequality and social stratification. This is demonstrated by the low 
investment in public welfare and the high dependency on employment for obtaining benefits. In 
Conservative regimes, emphasis on efficiency is also high, but the comparatively more robust 
public benefits serve to promote a higher overall baseline of equality than that of Liberal 
regimes. In Social Democratic states, emphasis on equality is highest across the three 
typologies, and emphasis on efficiency is lowest (although not, of course, absent). These patterns 
outline each welfare state’s “attitude” toward inequality, and are helpful for refining 
expectations regarding educational differentiation in cross-national comparisons, beyond the 
limitations of Hall and Soskice’s “varieties of capitalism” theory. 
 
1.3: Educational Differentiation as a Grouping Factor 
There are many ways in which educational systems can be studied and characterized, 
however, this analysis focuses on educational differentiation. Within my sample countries, 
educational differentiation manifests as students experiencing an “initial period of exposure to 
the same curriculum, followed by diversification of curricula into several tracks. … There are 
vocational and general or academic tracks, with allocation into tracks often based on previous 
performance and/or ability tests,” along with other measurable variables (Brunello et al, 2004). 
I chose to study national education based on patterns of differentiation throughout primary and 
secondary institutional education for several reasons. First, educational differentiation provides 
a clear and measurable range of comparison. Differentiation can be defined largely by variables 
that can be categorized, measured, and compared with relative ease and objectiveness. The 
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period of focus, primary and secondary education, was selected to align with the range of 
compulsory education in most modern democracies (ibid; Busemeyer 2015). Intersections 
between education and corporate interests can be operationalized by focusing on aspects such as 
the degree to which VET is institutionalized through the respective number of academic or 
vocational tracks. Similarly, the relationship between educational differentiation, welfare state 
typology, and stratification can be studied by examining trends such as the demographics of 
students participating in each track, and then analyzing subsequent academic and other 
(employment, income, etc.) outcomes. 
The second reason that educational differentiation is valuable for this analysis, is the 
existence of a rich body empirical research into cross-national stratification and inequality. 
Although this analysis primarily addresses attitudes toward education and stratification, it is 
useful to be able to refer to existing data measuring educational equity on a comparative, 
empirical basis. It also increases the potential value of this analysis, which could be useful for 
delving into the nuances of the relationship between educational differentiation and 
stratification in future research.  
 
1.4: Hypotheses 
The purpose of this analysis is to contribute to the relevant body of literature by 
exploring the relationship between a state’s macroeconomic and welfare organization, and its 
educational system. As described above, this analysis focuses on variables related to educational 
differentiation to characterize and compare national education systems. The variables used to 
describe differentiation include: (1) years of comprehensive education (all students learning 
together); (2) age at which tracking begins; (3) number of tracks; (4) proportion of tracks 
dedicated to each type of education (general, academic, or vocational education); (5) flexibility 
of each secondary certification in allowing entrance to different post-secondary tracks; and (6) 
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mechanism by which students are tracked (student/parent decision, teacher decision, 
standardized examination). Separately, I look at (7) how each national government 
conceptualizes education in relation to social stratification and inequality. Justification for these 
variables is included in the Methods section, and in each subsection of findings. 
My hypothesis is two-tiered. First, regarding the relationship between national economic 
structure and education, Hall and Soskice’s “varieties of capitalism” theory provides the basis for 
my assertion that educational differentiation will differ notably between countries classified as 
LMEs and those considered to be CMEs, specifically in regard to their incorporation of VET. (1) 
In LMEs, given the weak incentive or opportunity for firms to engage in the development of 
institutional education, I expect educational differentiation to be weakly defined in terms of the 
tracks offered, with non-existent or poorly defined vocational tracks. (2) Conversely, in CMEs, 
I expect to find much clearer delineation between academic and trade- or vocation-specific 
tracks, due to the active effort made to coordinate business interests with educational outcomes. 
Second, based on Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typologies, I expect to find that 
educational differentiation is least structured in the Liberal states, moderately structured in 
Social Democratic states, and the most structured in Conservative states. In comparing structure 
among regimes, I expect to find variation along the aforementioned factors, including the age at 
which differentiation occurs and number of years students learn together in comprehensive 
education, the proportion of tracks intended to provide general, academic, or vocational 
education, and the degree of autonomy students and parents have to choose or transfer children 
between tracks. Finally, I anticipate the relationship between education and inequality to be 
conceptualized by each government in a manner that aligns with the values of its welfare state, 
and its comparative attitude toward social stratification. 
Specifically, (1) in Liberal welfare regimes, I expect to find that educational 
differentiation is weakly defined – marked by long periods of comprehensive education (all 
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students learning together), later tracking of students, and the fewest and least-defined tracks in 
terms of curriculum. Furthermore, I expect students (and parents) in Liberal regimes to have 
the greatest autonomy in selecting or moving between tracks. These expectations are based on 
the underlying competition- and efficiency-driven attitude of Liberal states as LMEs, in which 
both firms and workers are trying to remain as flexible as possible, and attainment of sector-
specific skills is discouraged by a meager level of unemployment benefits and other social 
protections. Regarding governmental attitudes toward education and stratification, because 
inequality has historically been highest in Liberal states, I anticipate education to be posed as a 
resource rather than a right, and any mention of inequality to focus on students/individuals’ 
opportunities for self-advancement rather than any governmental responsibility to address 
stratification with education.  
(2) In Conservative regimes, I expect to find that patterns in educational differentiation 
are defined by two demands. First, because firms have traditionally had significant influence in 
Conservative regimes as CMEs, I expect to find strong definition of educational tracks, and 
specifically robust pathways for attaining vocational skills, supported by a more comprehensive 
provision of public benefits that supports an investment in industry-specific skills. Second, 
because Conservative regimes have traditionally been more invested in maintaining status, 
rather than reducing inequality, I expect to find that educational tracking is strict, giving 
students the least amount of flexibility. I anticipate this manifesting in short periods of 
comprehensive education, early differentiation, highly defined tracks, and low student (and 
parental) autonomy in selecting or moving between tracks. Considering the emphasis on 
maintaining social structures but higher baseline of public benefits than in Liberal regimes, I 
anticipate that governments in Conservative welfare states will depict quality education as a 
right, but also strongly emphasize the role of education in maintaining economic or social 
stability. 
13 
 
Finally, (3) in Social Democratic regimes, I expect educational differentiation to be the 
most complex. Due to greater involvement of firms as CMEs, I expect to find stronger vocational 
pathways, similar to the Conservative model. However, because Social Democratic values 
heavily emphasize equity, I expect students to have more flexibility and autonomy in 
determining their educational pathways than in the Conservative model. Pulled by both the need 
to support these two demands, I anticipate finding moderate periods of comprehensive tracking 
(longer than in Conservative regimes, but shorter than in Liberal states), tracking that begins 
later than in Conservative regimes but earlier than in Liberal ones, a strong presence of both 
vocational and academic or general defined tracks, and more student (and parental) input 
regarding tracking decisions. Given the strong emphasis on equity in Social Democratic states, I 
expect governments in these states to explicitly link educational to efforts to improve equality 
and reduce social stratification, and to emphasize the government’s role or responsibility in 
providing education. 
 
1.5: Methodology 
To test my hypotheses, I collected and analyzed data across nine countries. Given my 
theoretical basis, I used Hall and Soskice’s categorizations to select countries that represented 
LMEs and CMEs, and Esping-Andersen’s classification to ensure variety between Liberal, 
Conservative, and Social Democratic welfare states. The division of countries along these 
independent variables is depicted in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Macroeconomic and Welfare State Classification of Sample Nations 
Country Coordinated or Liberal Market 
Economy* 
Welfare State Typology** 
Canada LME Liberal 
U.S. LME Liberal 
UK LME Liberal 
Germany CME Conservative (Corporatist) 
France CME Conservative (Corporatist) 
Netherlands CME Conservative (Corporatist) 
Sweden CME Social Democratic 
Finland CME Social Democratic 
Norway CME Social Democratic 
*Hall & Soskice, 2001 
**Esping-Andersen, 1990 
 
Furthermore, I defined educational differentiation in each country by measuring six 
dependent variables. The variables are: (1) years of comprehensive education; (2) age at which 
tracking occurs; (3) number of tracks; (4) proportion of tracks dedicated to each type of 
education – general, academic, or vocational; (5) whether secondary certification (degree, 
diploma, etc.) was flexible or inflexible in terms of what post-secondary track students could 
pursue; and (6) primary party responsible for tracking decision (student/parent, teacher/school 
administrators, exam). This information was drawn primarily from OECD cross-national reports 
and fact sheets, and the European Commission’s Eurydice. I used founding government 
documents to explore indications of educational intention – (7) if and how education is framed 
in relation to social stratification, and whether the role of the individual or the state is 
considered predominant in achieving this goal.  
My justification for using the six aforementioned variables to define educational 
differentiation comes from their wide incorporation in the related body of research, and their 
relevance to the central questions and hypotheses of this analysis (Sorensen 1970, Collins 1977; 
Page 1991, Marks 2005, Pfeffer 2008). These variables are particularly valuable for comparative 
analysis because they provide objective measures of educational differentiation and minimize 
subjective bias. My exploration of governmental “attitudes” toward education and inequality is 
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less objective, but I tried to reduce my own partiality as much as possible, as described further in 
the relevant section of findings. 
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CHAPTER 2: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter details the findings of my analysis, conducted within the guidelines described in 
Chapter One. Findings are provided visually in tables, and explored in further detail in each of 
the following sections. 
 
1.1: Organization of Findings 
Findings related to the first six variables, which address measurable differences in 
educational differentiation, are organized into six subsects. Each subsect explores the respective 
variable as it is manifested across the sample countries, grouped by VoC and welfare state 
classification. A visual representation of the first six variables, those used to define patterns in 
educational differentiation, can be found in Appendix 1. Findings regarding attitudes toward 
education and stratification are described in a final, separate section. Because these results were 
much more complex in nature, they are not visually represented.  
The six subsects and descriptive “attitude” section are followed by a Discussion, which 
highlights overarching analysis, and offers additional considerations that could complicate 
perceived relationships. Finally, the Conclusion provides recommendations for further study 
and analysis. 
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1.2: Subsects I & II - Years of Comprehensive Education & Age at Tracking Onset 
Across the nine nations in the sample, and nearly all democracies worldwide, 
institutionalized education begins with a period of comprehensive learning, in which all 
students learn together and are exposed to the same curriculum (Brunello 2004). It is valuable 
to include length of comprehensive education as a variable, because research has consistently 
indicated that students with less socio-economically advantaged backgrounds benefit from 
longer periods of comprehensive education benefit, and are further disadvantaged by shorter 
periods of comprehensive studies (Manning and Pischke 2006; Boliver and Swift 2011; Holm et 
al 2013). The age at which tracking or differentiation occurs is relevant because studies have 
frequently (although not completely consistently) suggested that inequality is highest in 
educational systems with earlier tracking, compared to those where students are separated later 
(Marks 2005; Hanushek and Wößmann 2006; Pfeffer 2014). It is unclear if this effect is more 
strongly related to the total years of comprehensive education prior students participate in 
before differentiation, or an age-related factor. 
Based on varieties of capitalism theory, welfare state classifications, and prior research, I 
anticipate longer periods of comprehensive education and later tracking decisions in Liberal 
Market Economies than in Coordinated Market Economies, because of the lower involvement of 
business and stronger emphasis on the development of generalized skills during formal 
education (Hall & Soskice 2001; Busemeyer 2015). Across welfare state typologies, I expect 
comprehensive education to be longest, and tracking latest, in Liberal regimes, given the weak 
provision of public benefits and underlying values of competition and efficiency, which reiterate 
the value of more broadly applicable educational credentials. In Conservative regime states, I 
anticipate the shortest period of comprehensive education and earliest tracking, influenced by 
the strong involvement of the corporate sector and the emphasis on maintaining social 
structures over reducing inequality. I expect periods of comprehensive educational tracking and 
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age of tracking in Social Democratic states to fall between the other two regime types, due to the 
involvement of firms and more generous public benefits that encourage investment in more 
specific vocational education, countered by the Social Democratic priority of reducing inequality 
(Esping-Andersen 1990). 
My findings regarding years of comprehensive education (Table 2) broadly aligned with 
my expectations, although variation was very small. Between LMEs and CMEs, the three LMEs 
did incorporate the longest periods of comprehensive education. The Canadian, UK, and U.S. 
education systems each include about 10 years of comprehensive education. As the Liberal 
welfare regimes, this trend also followed my expectation that Liberal states would have the 
longest periods of students learning together, although only one year more than required in the 
Social Democratic states. There was very little consistency among the Conservative states, where 
years of comprehensive education ranged from only 4 years (German) to 8 and 9 in the 
Netherlands and France, respectively.  
Table 2: Timeline of Compulsory Education & Major Tracking Milestones 
Country CME / 
LME 
Welfare 
State Type 
Age when 
Education 
Begins 
Years of 
Compulsor
y 
Education 
Years of 
Comprehensi
ve Education 
Age when 
Differentiatio
n Begins 
Canada LME Liberal 5* 12* 10* 15 
U.S. LME Liberal 5* 11* 10* 15 
UK LME Liberal 5 11 (+2 pt) 11 16 
Germany CME Conservativ
e 
6 9 (+3 pt) 4 10 
France CME Conservativ
e 
6 10 9 15 
Netherlan
ds 
CME Conservativ
e 
5 13 8 13 
Sweden CME Social Dem. 7 9 9 16 
Finland CME Social Dem. 6 9 9 16 
Norway CME Social Dem. 6 10 9 16 
*Where variety by sub-national region, average is given 
Sources: European Commission Eurydice (2017); OECD Education at a Glance reports (2013-2017); 
OECD Education Policy Outlook reports (2013-2017) 
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Referring again to Table 2, it is clear that results regarding the age at which tracking 
begins do not align with my expectations. Although my sample is small, seven out of nine states 
– encompassing both LMEs and CMES and all three welfare typologies – begin differentiation 
when students are 15 or 16 years old. There are only two notable outliers in this sample: 
Germany, where students are tracked as early at 10 years of age, and the Netherlands, where 
students around tracked around age 13. It is relevant to note that several states have increased 
the years of comprehensive education by moving the differentiation point later. One of the most 
dramatic reorganizations was the UK, which began tracking at 16 years instead of 11 years in the 
mid-1960s (Brunello et al 2004). In the 1980s, France stopped a practice of tracking students 
directly into vocational apprenticeships after two years of lower secondary school, and Germany 
extended the period of compulsory comprehensive education by a year in the 1970s (ibid.). If 
years of comprehensive (or differentiated) education matter more than the age at which 
students are tracked in terms of stratification, then age may not have as strong a relationship as 
previously expected to educational inequality or social stratification. Still, the fact that multiple 
nations across both LME-Liberal and CME-Conservative regimes have passed legislation to 
increase comprehensive education is an interesting in what it may signal. It would be interesting 
to investigate further, to understand what motivated each nation to lengthen the period of 
comprehensive studies. 
Perhaps the most interesting observation regarded the timing and proportion of 
comprehensive education within each state and classification’s compulsory educational period. 
In the LMEs-Liberal welfare states, education began consistently earlier than in the CMEs-
Conservative/Social Democratic regime states. In the Social Democratic states, compulsory 
education was consistently all (or nearly all) comprehensive; Liberal states typically mandated 
at least one year of education beyond the differentiation point; and Conservative states required 
the longest periods of compulsory education beyond the differentiation point. 
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1.3: Subsects III & IV - Number of Tracks & Proportion of Tracks by Type 
The number and proportion of tracks by type is perhaps the most commonly studied 
relationship in scholarship pertaining to educational differentiation and VoC and/or the welfare 
state, with emphasis typically given to the comparative number of vocational and general or 
academic tracks (Sorensen 1970; Collins 1977; Manning & Pischke 2006; Busemeyer 2015). 
Although the definition of each track may be intuitive, it is worthwhile to reiterate them here. 
General curriculum is intended to impart skills and knowledge that students could apply in 
either further studies or vocational careers; university curriculum specifically aims to prepare 
students for higher (tertiary) non-vocational education; and vocational curriculum focuses on 
the development of skills related to a particular trade or industry (Collins 1977; Terwel 2005; 
Harris 2011).  
Regarding macroeconomic structure, I expect to find fewer tracks – and specifically 
fewer vocational tracks – among LME states compared to CME countries, due to the lower 
engagement of the corporate sector in institutionalized education in LMEs, and the lower 
incentives in LMEs for both employers and employees to pursue specific training before 
employment. Conversely, I anticipate that in CMEs, where business interests and competition 
are more moderated by the state, there will be a higher number of tracks, with particular 
emphasis on vocational curriculum. Among welfare state typologies, I expect to find the fewest 
and most general tracks in Liberal states, where competition and market supply and demands 
are prominent, and the public benefits net is lowest; the most and most specific tracks in 
Conservative states, where maintenance of stratification and structure are high, and public 
benefits have a higher baseline; and a moderate number of tracks in the Social Democratic 
states, where government coordination is balanced by a strong emphasis on equitable 
educational access and student choice.  
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The findings for subsects three and four (illustrated in Table 3) partially align with my 
expectations. As predicted, LME-Liberal welfare states have both the lowest number of and least 
clearly defined tracks, while CME countries exhibit both the highest number of and most clearly 
differentiated tracks. In Canada, the UK, and the U.S., most secondary schools provide 
comprehensive education, and vocational training is significantly under-represented, although 
recent legislation in all three countries has indicated increasing emphasis on bolstering VET 
(Brunello et al 2004; Hanushek and Wößmann 2006; Verdugo 2014). Although secondary 
education is considered comprehensive, it should be understood that not all students in each 
LME-Liberal country participate in identical curriculum (within their respective nation). The 
label “mixed” in Table 3 denotes where variety in curriculum exists, but not necessarily in a way 
that separates students into easily distinguishable tracks. In each system, educational 
differentiation often occurs via “personalized learning” in the classroom (or “Universal Design 
for Learning”), or through “advanced” and “regular” subject tracks, which cover material at 
different speeds or with different expected outcomes (OECD TALS 2013; Ontario Public Service 
2013; Schührer et al 2016). Even when curriculum is more distinctly differentiated by sorting 
students into different classrooms, differentiation frequently occurs on a subject-specific basis, 
making it feasible that a student could participate in the “advanced” track of one subject and the 
“regular” track of another. A recent case study of curricular differentiation in the U.S. suggests 
that even this more comprehensive approach has deeply stratifying effects, however that specific 
line of inquiry is nascent and requires further empirical research (Loveless 2016; Schührer et al 
2016). 
Unlike in LME-Liberal welfare states, educational differentiation in CME-
Conservative/Social Democratic nations is, on the whole, much more clearly defined in terms of 
number and specificity of tracks. Germany, France, and the Netherlands (the Conservative 
states) each offer approximately three different tracks (some slight variation among the German 
Länder exists) – one of which explicitly prepares students for tertiary academic studies 
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(university), one of the second of which focuses on vocational skills training (with some general 
foundational coursework required), and one of which provides a broader education which can be 
continued toward either higher education or a vocational career. In Sweden, Finland, and 
Norway (the Social Democratic states), there are clear vocational pathways, but they have higher 
general/academic requirements as compared to the CME-Conservative states. In Germany, 
France, the Netherlands, and Finland, students in separate curricular tracks are more frequently 
segregated into distinct schools, whereas students in Sweden and Norway frequently attend 
coursework in a more comprehensive setting (OECD Eurydice 2017). This is depicted in Table 3 
by Sweden’s and Norway’s “single-track” system, which offer a high number of curricular 
“programs” within upper secondary education, at a 1:2 ratio of general/academic to vocational 
programs in Sweden and a 1:3 ratio of general/academic to vocational programs in Norway. 
 
Table 3: Number & Classification of Educational Track 
Country CME / 
LME 
Welfare State 
Type 
Number of Tracks by Type* 
Canada LME Liberal 1 (gen/mixed) 
U.S. LME Liberal 1 (gen/mixed) 
UK LME Liberal 1 (gen/mixed) 
Germany CME Conservative 3 (1 gen, 1 uni, 1 voc) 
France CME Conservative 3 (1 gen, 1 uni, 1 voc) 
Netherland
s 
CME Conservative 3 (1 gen, 1 uni, 1 voc); (2 uni, 4 voc prog) 
Sweden CME Social Dem. 1 (6 uni, 12 voc prog) 
Finland CME Social Dem. 3 (1 gen, 2 voc) 
Norway CME Social Dem. 1 (3 uni, 9 voc prog) 
*(gen = general coursework; uni = university preparatory curriculum; voc = vocational preparatory 
coursework) 
Sources: European Commission Eurydice (2017); OECD Education at a Glance reports (2013-2017); 
OECD Education Policy Outlook reports (2013-2017) 
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1.4: Subsect V - Flexibility of Certificate by Track 
A major factor in determining the “strictness” of educational differentiation is based on 
the flexibility that students have to transfer between tracks to attain different post-secondary 
outcomes (Sorensen 1970; Collins 1977; Lindberg 2007). Prior scholarship has sought to explore 
this factor in relation to path-dependency and stratification (Noelke and Kogan 2012; Bartl and 
Sackman 2014; Pfeffer 2015; Schührer et al 2016). Because “potential for mobility” during 
education is extremely difficult to define or measure objectively, in this analysis I instead focus 
on a variable with arguably less ambiguity – how strictly post-secondary outcomes are 
constrained based on a student’s secondary certification. To assess flexibility of certificate by 
track, I ask two questions: First, does the certification students receive at the end of each track 
(general, academic, or vocational) provide them with limited options for post-secondary 
education or work, or does it enable them to pursue multiple pathways? Second, does an 
efficient pathway (one not requiring lengthy additional education or training) exist for students 
to obtain qualifications that would enable them to pursue another pathway? 
Because flexibility of degree or ease of re-certification would permit the greatest ability 
for individuals to respond to market demands or provide companies with a larger supply of 
potential employees, I expect to find that educational certification in the LME-Liberal welfare 
states is the least strict. By contrast, I expect to find the lowest flexibility in CME-Conservative 
welfare states, where corporate interests have been most highly institutionalized and structure 
and stratification are central. In CME-Social Democratic states, I anticipate moderate flexibility 
in certification, given the balance between demands of the coordinated market economy and 
Social Democratic emphasis on equality.  
Results consistently show that where differentiation is strictest (as defined by variables 
III and IV), the secondary certification is least flexible, and where differentiation is least strict 
(same variables), the secondary certification is most flexible. This makes the LME-Liberal states 
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and CME-Social Democratic states most similar, and the CME-Conservative states least similar 
in some regards. Variation across this variable by country is most complex and so it is valuable 
to provide a more detailed description of each respective practice regarding the secondary 
degree.  
The U.S. and Canada are perhaps most similar regarding entrance into post-secondary 
education or training. In both countries, students who successfully complete secondary 
education (receive passing grades) can apply to continue on to tertiary education or vocational 
training. Students on a vocational track that ended before completion of secondary education 
who wish to pursue tertiary education may seek an alternate secondary certification (community 
college or GED completion in the U.S. and CEGEP completion in Canada). This can typically be 
achieved in a short period of time (1-2 years) (U.S. Dept of Ed, CMEC). Notably, unlike in some 
other countries, acceptance into tertiary education after completion of a secondary qualification 
is not guaranteed. Individual universities and colleges have nearly complete autonomy in 
selecting which students to accept or decline. Tertiary institutions may also place additional 
requirements on students for acceptance, such as participation in standardized examinations. 
In Germany, France, the UK, and the Netherlands, access to tertiary education is more or 
less guaranteed, following successful completion of a matriculation exam (OECD 2017). The 
names of the respective matriculation exam in each country (if applicable) is provided in Table 
4. In Germany, France, and the Netherlands, students on the university track are being actively 
prepared for the matriculation exam throughout their curriculum, and students on the general 
or vocational track can take the exam, but likely require additional curricular support or time to 
prepare. In the UK, this is also true, but because education is less strictly differentiated, general 
or vocational track students may be better prepared to take the examination without significant 
additional education. In the Netherlands, individuals holding a secondary academic certification 
can choose to transfer to a vocational school. In France, students define the pathway of their 
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future by the type of baccalaureate certification they pursue – general, technical, or professional. 
In Germany, students are granted access to the university track by successfully completing the 
abitur, and students on a general or vocational track may take an examination for entrance to a 
general higher education school (Fachhochschule) or separate exams for vocational 
qualification.  
In Sweden, Finland, and Norway, tertiary education is perhaps the most accessible. 
Students must pass coursework with certain curricular requirements, and must pass 
examinations throughout their studies, but, similar to the U.S. and Canada, there is no national 
matriculation test (except in Finland, but the matriculation exam is optional). In Norway and 
Finland, there is a separate post-secondary vocational qualification, whereas in Sweden there is 
only one certification which can be applied to pursue either tertiary academic or vocational 
further education. 
 
Table 4: Flexibility of Secondary Degree or Certification 
Country CME / 
LME 
Welfare State Type Secondary Degree Flexibility 
Canada LME Liberal Flexible (diploma / curriculum req.) 
U.S. LME Liberal Flexible (diploma / GED / curriculum req.) 
UK LME Liberal Flexible (A-levels) 
Germany CME Conservative 1 Inflexible; 2 Flexible (abitur) 
France CME Conservative Flexible (baccalaureate – 3 types) 
Netherlan
ds 
CME Conservative 1 Inflexible; 2 Flexible (national/school 
exams) 
Sweden CME Social Dem. Flexible (diploma / curriculum req.) 
Finland CME Social Dem. Flexible (matriculation exam) 
Norway CME Social Dem. Flexible (diploma / curriculum req.) 
Sources: European Commission Eurydice (2017); OECD Education at a Glance reports (2013-2017); 
OECD Education Policy Outlook reports (2013-2017) 
 
As illustrated, even with relatively objective measures in place, it is difficult to compare 
the degree of flexibility in a state’s secondary certifications. Very broadly, the LME-Liberal and 
CME-Social Democratic systems share a tendency toward broader secondary certifications, and 
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greater flexibility for students. However, there is a significant divide between the accessibility of 
tertiary education, which is more competitive in Liberal states and more equitable in Social 
Democratic nations. Generally, the CME-Conservative nations are the most structured, but still 
offer some pathways for students to seek additional qualifications if they choose to pursue a 
post-secondary opportunity that they are not already tracked towards. How often this occurs in 
practice, however, is unclear. 
 
1.5: Subsect VI - Primary Tracking Determinant 
The final variable in this analysis focuses on what factors or actors are responsible for 
determining students’ track. This aspect of educational differentiation has received increasing 
attention in education and inequality scholarship. Although the breadth of research is still 
somewhat limited, findings generally suggest that methods of differentiation with less 
standardization, such as teacher or school recommendations, may exacerbate inequality 
(Dornbusch et al 1996, Harris 2011, Bartl and Sackman 2014, Hollstein 2016). However, 
research also indicate that standardized tests may also reinforce existing stratification in 
limiting access to higher education (Santelices and Wilson 2010; Hiss and Franks 2014; Reeves 
and Halikias 2017). 
It is difficult to formulate a hypothesis regarding tracking determinants based on 
varieties of capitalism theory, but one may anticipate several trends based on welfare state 
typologies given their historical attitudes toward stratification and inequality. Considering their 
emphasis on retaining social structures and subsidiarity, I expect to find the least 
standardization in CME-Conservative welfare states. Conversely, given the emphasis on equity 
and equality, I might expect to find the greatest reliance on standardized measure in the Social 
Democratic nations. In Liberal states, it’s difficult to say whether standardized methods of 
tracking students might be considered as aiding or hindering efficiency and competition. 
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The findings, summarized in Table 5, outline how student tracking is determined in each 
sample country. Among the six variables used to define differentiation in this analysis, tracking 
determinant was the most difficult to classify for several reasons. First, this information was less 
standardized in cross-national reports, and so data was occasionally drawn from multiple 
sources, possibly resulting in a higher degree of inconsistency. Second, multiple factors are 
involved in the tracking decision in nearly every country, and most sources provided very little 
detail regarding which aspects were predominant in the tracking decision. This could be 
amended by reaching out to local experts in each country who have a personal knowledge of 
each system and the relative importance of each factor in driving differentiation decisions. Due 
to these shortcomings, I recommend analyzing these findings critically and assuming that 
further research is needed to validate my analysis.  
The overarching trend showed similarities between the LME-Liberal welfare state 
nations and the CME-Social Democratic nations. In both groupings, tracking is decided based 
primarily on the results of standardized assessments (examinations or grades) and student 
choice, although LME-Liberal welfare states tend to favor choice, while CME-Social Democratic 
welfare nations tend to favor assessment. The one outlier to this trend is Sweden, where student 
choice is explicitly emphasized and honored, as long as minimum requirements were met 
(Eurydice 2016). The LME-Liberal states had the most ambiguity surrounding the decision and 
the highest variety among sub-regions (provinces, states, etc.), but generally the decision 
appears to be made based on grades, with a significant opportunity for students or families to 
override the tracking decision if they disagree with the recommended curricular path. In the 
CME-Conservative welfare regimes, results were more mixed. Typically, consideration of past 
academic performance (grades or assessments), and recommendations from teachers or school 
boards (in France, a “class council”; in Germany an academic report from the teacher; and in the 
Netherlands the Cito test and a report constructed by the head teacher and teaching staff) 
shapes recommendations for student tracking (Eurydice 2016). 
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While it would be helpful to have more data to support this analysis, the information 
collected here suggests that LME-Liberal nations do have a propensity for a more choice- or 
competition-based model, in which grades and individual choice are the key factors used to 
determine differentiation. Similarly, CME-Conservative states model the concept of subsidiarity, 
in naming teachers and schools the main decision-makers. CME-Social Democratic nations have 
the least consistency, using a mixture of more standardized assessments (exams and grades) 
alongside teacher or student input. In many ways Sweden seems closer to a LME-Liberal welfare 
state in this capacity, which is interesting. 
 
Table 5: Determinant of Initial Student Tracking 
Country CME / 
LME 
Welfare State 
Type 
Initial Tracking Determinant 
Canada LME Liberal Choice / Grades 
U.S. LME Liberal Choice / Grades / Teachers 
UK LME Liberal Choice / Grades 
Germany CME Conservative Teachers / Schools 
France CME Conservative Teachers / Schools 
Netherlan
ds 
CME Conservative Assessment (school) / Teachers 
Sweden CME Social Dem. Choice / Grades 
Finland CME Social Dem. Assessment (school) / Teachers 
Norway CME Social Dem. Assessment (national) / Students 
Sources: European Commission Eurydice  (2017); OECD Education at a Glance reports (2013-
2017); OECD Education Policy Outlook reports (2013-2017) 
 
1.6: Attitudes toward Education across Varieties of Capitalism & Welfare State 
The final exploration of this analysis regards state attitudes toward education and 
stratification or inequality. This question focuses less on each nation’s VoC classification, and 
more on its welfare state typology. In alignment with Esping-Andersen’s characterization of 
each regime, I expect to find that education in the Liberal regimes is posed as a resource to be 
leveraged by workers to improve competition, not a right, and for references to education and 
inequality to focus on individuals’ opportunity to promote themselves and enhance their quality 
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of life through education. I predict that Social Democratic welfare states will take the opposite 
approach, emphasizing the role of education in reducing social inequality and posing education 
as a human right, the responsibility of which lies predominantly with the government and not 
the individual. This expectation is based on Esping-Andersen’s characterization of Social 
Democratic states as being particularly concerned with decreasing social inequity. Finally, I 
expect Conservative welfare regimes to combine these factors, speaking to education as a 
human right, because of their higher baseline of social benefits than Liberal states, but also to 
reiterate education’s role in supporting the state’s social and economic structure and stability. 
To retain objectivity as much as possible, I drew from each state’s primary documents, 
including state constitutions and founding education documents. To supplement, I examined 
statements provided directly from national education departments to broader institutions like 
the OECD and European Commission. Given their complexity, findings are organized by brief 
country summaries, rather than a comparison chart. 
 
Canada 
The Canadian constitution establishes education as the legislative and administrative 
responsibility of each province or territory, with the stipulation that no region’s decisions in that 
realm may interfere with any citizen’s basic rights. Because of this structure, I consulted regional 
documents to get a sense of how education is framed. Across nearly every province and 
territory’s mission statements and charters, several themes recurred: individual potential, 
economic growth, and societal development. Only two provinces (Manitoba and Ontario) 
explicitly emphasized the responsibility of the state in ensuring education; most documents 
talked about education as a resource of which individuals could take advantage. New Brunswick 
alone spoke to the intention of education to support democratic values, and only Ontario 
directly addressed inequality as part of their recent ‘Achieving Excellence’ initiative. 
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United States 
The U.S. constitution makes no reference to education; as such, education has 
historically been largely controlled at the individual state level. Due to practical constraints, I 
did not analyze the educational charters of each state and territories (although that would 
certainly be an interesting course for further research), but rather looked at major federal 
legislation regarding education. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, signed 
into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson, was established “to provide all children significant 
opportunity to receive a fair, equitable, and high-quality education, and to close educational 
achievement gaps” (ESEA 1965). The spirit of that document has been reiterated throughout 
later versions of the act, most recently the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 and the Every 
Student Succeeds Act of 2015. The U.S. Department of Education has put forth the following 
additional objectives: preparing individuals for citizenship and participation in the workforce, 
enhancing the competitiveness of the U.S. in a global market, and cultivating critical thinking 
skills. 
 
United Kingdom 
Because the UK has no codified constitution, I instead explored national education-
specific legislation. The primary document regarding education is the Education Act, most 
recently ratified in 2011. The Education Act is mainly concerned with the organization of 
institutionalized education, but puts significant emphasis on the rights and responsibilities of 
the family to pursue their desired type of education. “The parent of every child of compulsory 
school age shall cause him to receive efficient full-time education suitable (a) to his age, ability 
and aptitude, and (b) to any special educational needs he may have, either by regular attendance 
at school or otherwise” (Education Act 2011). The UK Department for Education outlines three 
primary goals in their mission statement: the safety and wellbeing of all children, with 
opportunities to succeed “as good as those for any other child”; access to high-quality education 
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regardless of background; and preparedness to contribute to the UK economy and society 
(gov.uk). 
 
Germany 
The foundational values of German education are laid forth in two documents: the 
German constitution and the mission statement of the German Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research (BMBF). The constitution allocates educational decision-making to the individual 
states (Länder), and encourages coordination regarding assessment and recommendations 
(Bundestag 1949). The BMBF provides a much more comprehensive set of guidelines and 
objectives, with particular emphasis on the federal government’s shared responsibilities 
regarding vocational education, higher education, lifelong learning, and research initiatives. The 
BMBF also speaks directly in education and inequality: “One of our priority concerns is the 
establishment of social equality in education to ensure that a person's background no longer 
determines his or her chances to get an education and that no talent is wasted” (BMBF 2017). It 
is perhaps unsurprising that even educational equity is framed in reference to the individual’s 
potential to contribute to the state. 
 
France 
The French constitution establishes “free, public, and secular” education as a duty of the 
state, which “guarantees equal access for children and adults to instruction, vocational training 
and culture” (Preamble 1946). The French Ministry for Education emphasizes the role of 
education in transmitting the national values, including democracy, citizenship, and a 
commitment to fight all forms of discrimination. Additionally, the mission statement focuses on 
training and development and the free access of educational resources. Above all, both the 
French constitution and educational mission statement repeatedly reiterate the central 
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importance of secularity, which must be both expressed and furthered through institutionalized 
education in the country. 
 
Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, Article 23 of the national constitution addresses citizens’ right to 
education. According to the constitution, education is the “constant concern of the 
Government”, although the constitution also strongly emphasizes the right of individuals to 
provide education (including private and religious education), so long as it follows the tenets of 
Dutch law. “People have the right to found schools and to provide teaching based on religious, 
ideological or educational beliefs” (Article 23). The Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science 
has a four-tiered mission statement, which focuses on the requirement that quality education is 
available to all, to prepare them for “personal independence and responsibility,” and on 
ensuring that “everyone has the opportunity to experience and enjoy culture” and that “teachers, 
artists, and scientists” have the resources and freedom to work (MECS 2017). 
 
Sweden 
The Swedish constitution includes four distinct mentions of education, two of which are 
particularly relevant. First, Ch. 1 (Basic Principles), Art. 2 states that in Sweden, the “personal, 
economic and cultural welfare of the private person shall be fundamental aims of public activity. 
In particular, it shall be incumbent upon the public institutions to secure the right to health, 
employment, housing and education, and to promote social care and social security.” Ch. 2 
(Fundamental Rights & Freedoms), Art. 21 secures each child’s right to free, public, basic 
education and places the responsibility of higher education in the public sector. The second 
primary reference was drawn from the Swedish government’s statement to the European 
Commission on its fundamental educational principles and policies – namely that “all children 
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and youth must have access to equivalent education, regardless of gender, place of residence and 
social and financial background” (Eurydice 2016).  
 
Finland 
Section 16 of the Finnish constitution guarantees all citizens the “right to basic education 
free of charge”, and directs public authorities to provide “for everyone equal opportunity to 
receive other educational services in accordance with their ability and special needs, as well as 
the opportunity to develop themselves without being prevented by economic hardship” 
(Ministry of Justice 1999). The Finnish National Agency for Education further defines the key 
principles of the Finnish education system – quality, efficiency, equity, and internationalism – 
and states that its underlying objectives are to support lifelong learning and free education, as 
well as the “competitiveness and wellbeing” of the broader Finnish society (FNAE 2017). An 
interesting historical note in Finland’s Eurydice report notes that eliminating educational 
inequality between rural and urban areas was one of the earliest aims of the Finnish education 
system (2017).   
 
Norway 
Norway’s constitution – the second-oldest in the world – was founded on three basic 
principles: sovereignty of the people, the separation of powers, and human rights. Article 109 
speaks directly to education as a basic human right, guaranteed by the constitution, and states 
that “education shall safeguard the individual’s abilities and needs, and promote respect for 
democracy, the rule of law and human rights” (Norwegian Constitution 1814). The Norwegian 
Ministry of Education and Research emphasizes the autonomy of local authorities in 
administering education among other basic welfare services, promotes education’s role in 
supporting the state’s economic and workforce needs, and reiterates that accessible and 
equitable education is “key to developing and refining a democratic culture”  (Eurydice 2017). 
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Analysis 
Overall, the attitudes toward education expressed by each nation’s founding charters and 
respective ministries for education were largely homogenous, and there was very little difference 
among nations that was consistent based on their variety of capitalism or welfare state typology. 
Every nation underscored four essential goals of institutional education: economic stability and 
growth, societal development, equal accessibility of basic education, and individual opportunity. 
The U.S., Germany, France, Finland, and Norway explicitly spoke to the role of education in 
addressing inequality.3 4 France and Norway alone spoke to education in relation to democratic 
values.5 This does not suggest that attitudes toward education do not differ significantly between 
countries, but homogeneity in primary documents suggests that another methodology may be 
more appropriate for pursuing this question. 
 
  
                                                          
3 And Ontario 
4 While Sweden’s primary documents did not explicitly address education and inequality, they did reference that 
inequality is low in Sweden. 
5 And New Brunswick 
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CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, & CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
 
Introduction 
 This section reviews the broad findings of this analysis, and discusses how well findings 
aligned with predictions. Potential implications of these findings are then considered.  
 
1.1: Review of Purpose & Key Findings 
The purpose of this analysis was to identify trends in educational differentiation, and 
whether they occur among states based on their respective variety of capitalism (LME or CME) 
and welfare state typology (Liberal, Conservative, or Social Democratic). Educational 
differentiation was defined by six variables that could be measured with relative impartiality. As 
a secondary consideration, this analysis asked whether attitudes toward education and 
inequality expressed by national constitutions and national bodies governing education might 
also be related to their VoC and welfare regime type. 
Across my sample countries, LME states (which were also the Liberal welfare regimes) 
and do exhibit a relatively high degree of consistency. Comprehensive education begins earlier 
and is therefore longer in all LMEs than in any CME. Differentiation in each begins around age 
15 (16 in the UK). Each of the three states offer a single “track” of education post-differentiation, 
in which students have a baseline of academic requirements, some of which can be pursued on 
“advanced” or “regular” tracks, and a relatively high degree of autonomy to choose additional 
coursework or vocational courses. In terms of academic credentials, the Canadian and U.S. 
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systems are most similar, offering a high school diploma based on passing grades and fulfillment 
of curricular requirements, or alternative secondary credentials. In each case, these credentials 
are sufficient to seek placement in post-secondary academic or vocational education, which is 
competitively selective. The UK model differs in its requirement that students complete A-level 
exams in order to pursue university studies. Finally, in terms of how students are differentiated, 
grades and student choice are predominant in all three LME-Liberal countries, with perhaps 
greater additional influence of teachers in the U.S. system. 
Among all CME nations, there is strong variation in economic differentiation along the 
measured variables. However, CME-Social Democratic nations do exhibit a relatively high 
degree of consistency, particularly as compared to the LMEs. School start at age six in Finland 
and Norway, and age seven in Sweden – consistently later than in the LME-Liberal states. 
Additionally, and in part due to this later start, the length of comprehensive education is 
consistently shorter than in the LMEs, at 9 years instead of 10 or 11. Differentiation in the Social 
Democratic states in my sample consistently begins at age 16. In many ways, curricular 
pathways in CME-Social Democratic and LME-Liberal states are similar. Except in Finland, 
students typically all attend the same school, and choose from among academic or vocational 
curriculum. While the majority of options are general or academically focused in LME-Liberal 
nations, the CME-Social Democratic systems offer a 2:1 (Sweden, Finland) or 3:1 (Norway) mix 
of vocational and general-academic pathways. Additionally, these pathways are much more 
clearly defined in all of the Social Democratic states than in any of the LME-Liberal states, with 
the possible exception of the UK. Regarding secondary degree flexibility, Sweden and Norway 
are closer to the LME-Liberal model, based on a diploma obtained after achieving passing 
grades across set curricular requirements. In Finland, students take a matriculation exam at the 
end of upper secondary school. In Finland and Norway, students who achieve upper secondary 
school credentials can choose between further vocational or academic studies; in Sweden 
students must take vocational-specific exams to continue on that pathway. Finally, in terms of 
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tracking determinant, Sweden most resembles the LME-Liberal states, emphasizing student 
grades and choice in making the tracking decision, while Finland and Norway base the decision 
more heavily on standardized assessment (nationally determined in Norway) and either teacher 
(Finland) or student (Norway) input.  
The CME-Conservative states have the greatest variety across all variables. Education 
begins in age 6 in France and Germany, age 5 in the Netherlands. Years of comprehensive 
education is highly variable, ranging from only 4 years In Germany, to 9 in France (8 in the 
Netherlands). Similarly, differentiation begins much earlier in Germany (age 10) and the 
Netherlands (age 13) than in either the LME-Liberal states or CME-Social Democratic states, 
whereas France (age 15) resembles the LME-Liberal nations. In terms of the number and types 
of tracks available, the three CME-Conservative states share some commonalities. Each systems 
offers three curricular tracks – one general/academic, one academic, and one vocational. In 
Germany (as in Finland), students typically attend separate institutions based on their 
curricular track, whereas in the Netherlands and France, students attend the same schools 
(similar to the LME-Liberal and CME-Social Democratic states) but choose between clearly 
differentiated curricular pathways (similar to Sweden and Norway).6 Concerning flexibility of 
degree, in Germany, France, and the Netherlands (as in the UK and Finland), access to post-
secondary education (vocational or academic) requires completion of a national examination. 
Access to tertiary education is particularly strict, and while students on the university track are 
explicitly prepared to take the university entrance exam, students in the general or vocational 
track are not, although they can choose to take it. Lastly, regarding tracking determinants, 
Germany and France rely heavily on a combination of teacher or school recommendations, and 
the Netherlands (as in Finland) also considers results on a national assessment (Cito test). 
                                                          
6 I have to triple-check on whether France is primarily a single school or separate schools 
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Overall, educational differentiation in the LME-Liberal states sampled, while not 
identical, shares the most commonalities and has the most distinct profile compared to the other 
two groupings. The CME-Social Democratic nations are second most closely-related, although 
there is less consistency in how differentiation decisions are made and the flexibility of 
secondary educational credentials. The CME-Conservative nations have the least consistency, 
both among themselves and in their differences compared to either of the other two groupings. 
Results from my analysis of attitudes toward education and inequality among states was almost 
entirely inconclusive. All nations professed education’s role in serving their commitment to four 
core values: accessibility, individual opportunity, economic growth, and social development. 
There was no clear relationship observed between any state’s welfare typology or VoC, and its 
respective model for educational differentiation. 
 
1.2: Considerations 
There are a few important considerations regarding my findings and analysis. First, I 
analyzed a relatively small sample of countries. A more comprehensive follow-up analysis could 
contextualize these findings by measuring the same variables across a larger body of nations. 
Second, the degree to which education is centralized or decentralized varies significantly 
between nations, and was addressed only at the highest level in this analysis. Given the purpose 
of this paper and practical limitations, it was impossible to incorporate this variable, but doing 
so might shed light on additional variation or similarity in educational differentiation, 
particularly in countries where education is highly decentralized. Finally, as noted in subsect six 
on tracking determinant, this variable was less easily measurable, which may have led to an 
unclear or inaccurate assessment. Consulting experts from each respective nation could provide 
a more conclusive or comprehensive measurement of this variable. 
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1.3: Conclusion 
In this analysis, I intended to study patterns of educational differentiation by national 
economic and welfare state characteristics. Broadly, my findings underscore the complexity of 
educational differentiation. Analysis suggests that, while consistency occurs across some 
variables of differentiation according to state economic and welfare state classification, 
proposing that distinct LME/CME or Liberal/Conservative/Social Democratic models education 
exist would likely be inaccurate in at least two ways: 1) By overlooking variations in educational 
differentiation that exists between countries within the same VoC or welfare state typology; 2) 
By exaggerating differences in educational differentiation between countries in different VoC or 
welfare regimes, which in reality share similarities. 
These findings are valuable to the relevant body of research because they suggest a more 
precise way of studying educational differentiation in relation to broader economic or social 
policy environments. Additionally, in acknowledging variety within VoC and welfare state 
typologies, this analysis suggests that it may be more accurate to explore how individual aspects 
of educational differentiation relate to trends in socio-economic outcomes and stratification, 
and how these contribute to cross-national patterns. Future research might, for instance, ask 
whether demographic patterns occur among various student outcomes (assessment scores, 
enrollment by academic/general/vocational track, rate of secondary school completion, post-
secondary enrollment, etc.), based on the way in which educational differentiation is structured 
or implemented. This could lead to important knowledge that could shape education policy, 
particularly that related to educational differentiation. 
Educational differentiation is a central aspect of nearly every modern democracy’s 
education system. Its relationship to national economic and welfare state organization, however, 
still remains largely unexplored. This analysis was intended to further our knowledge of patterns 
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in educational differentiation, and its conclusions raise many more questions whose answers 
could improve our understanding of the complex relationship between state, education, and 
stratification. 
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APPENDIX 1: COMPOSITE TABLE OF EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION VARIABLES BY 
NATION 
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